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ABSTRACT

This study has tried to clarify Confederate popular
attitudes towards England and, to the extent she impinged on the
subject, to France*
Since the major source of information by far was the
newspaper press, an attempt has been made, at the outset, to argue
for the significance of local newspapers as legitimate voices of
popular opinion.
The hypothesis is that local papers
simultaneously influenced and were influenced by the communities
they served*
The study is divided into three parts*
The first looks at
the major issues: The English declaration of neutrality, the
Northern blockade, and the question of European recognition*
The second traces the movement of attitudes from high optimism in
the prospect of European intervention, through doubt, and then to
the loss of hope.
The third part examines the influence of
"King Cotton" and the shift of attention from England as a
potential ally to France.

INTRODUCTION

I share M.E. Massey's admiration for Frank Owsley's King
Cotton Diplomacy, but also the view that Owsley failed to stress "the
people's views, hopes, and disappointments."^

By researching the

local newspapers from which the ordinary people presumably derived
much of their information I hope that the emphasis will be on
popular attitudes.

Eight newspapers were used for this study and they were
selected on the basis of the following criteria:

that they were

available locally in reasonably continuous runs5

that they had good

circulations;

and that they represented a wide geographical and

social range.

Three of the papers were published in Richmond, Virginia:
Examiner, Enquirer, and Whi g .

the

This preponderance reflects the

importance of the city as a centre of politics and communications;
New Orleans is represented by the New Orleans Bee and Alabama by the
Mobile Register and Advertiser.

Georgia's powerful cotton culture is

represented by the Macon Daily Telegraph, the Columbus Daily Enquirer,
and the Weekly Columbus Enquirer.

^"Arthur S. Link and Rembert W. Patrick, eds., Writing Southern
History:
Essays in Historiography in Honor of F.M. Green
(Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University, 1965) p.260.

The vast majority of citations in this thesis are for
newspapers published during the first two years of the war.

This i

partly because, as I discuss later, the number of papers diminished
greatly due to a shortage of materials, a disruption of
communications, and closure following invasion.

It also reflects,

however, the level of Southern interest in Europe.

This interest

did not neatly follow either good or bad Confederate military
fortunes in a kind of compensatory fashion.
simpler pattern.

It followed a much

At the start of the war Confederate press
I

opinion was certain of European, especially British, involvement in
the war in the interests of the cotton supply.
European attitudes was very high indeed.

So press interest i

The Trent affair revived

now flagging interest when it seemed that English pride, rather than
economic self-interest, might again make intervention possible.
Again, expectations were not realised.

As the war dragged on the

prospect of intervention diminished further.

Without the hope of

European involvement there was nothing in that far-off continent to
arouse interest;

it became un-newsworthy.

CHAPTER 1
A FREEDOM ABUNDANTLY USED
The dangers of relying on newspapers for historical research
are well known:

there are sometimes factual inaccuracies,

contradictions, partiality, editorial slanting and selection.

As

E. Merton Coulter says, however, these cautions apply to news
reporting and not to editorial comment.^
nature, cannot be inaccurate:

Editorial opinion, by its

it can only be to varying degrees

honest, intelligent, perceptive, independent, informed, and so on.
At the very least a study of such opinion will give the researcher a
summary of attitudes that were held by a number of influential people
in different parts of the country.

But it may also be claimed that

those editors spoke not merely as individuals, but as spokesmen for a
far wider constituency.
following is based:

Such is the hypothesis on which the

that editors did in fact guide and form, but also

reflected, public opinion.
of journalists so to do.

2

In normal times it is the raison d'etre
The relationship between newspapermen and

the public was almost certainly sharper in a period of desperate danger
and isolation, when the newspapers were virtually the only printed
means of disseminating information.

^E. Merton Coulter, The Confederate States of America,
1861-1865 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press,
1950), p.583.
2

i

This issue is raised by Eunice Wead, "British Public Opinion
of the Peace with America in 1782, "American Historical
Review, XXVI (April 1929), pp. 530-531.

That collectively newspapers played an important part in the
progress of the Civil War is almost beyond doubt.

Coulter suggests

that their influence was so immense that the press had "almost within
its keeping the very destiny of the Confederacy."

3

Charles S. Sydnor

acknowledges the "powerful influence" of the Richmond editors of the
Old South, and Harrison Trexler claims that the decline of
Confederate morale was to a significant degree the responsibility of
the Richmond press.

4

Soon after the war, James Grant referred to

the "powerful influence" of the editors in his history of the
American p r e s s . T h e

sheer number of journals published in the

Southern states is a clue to their importance.
estimated at something like eight hundred:

This has been

country newspapers, the

church press, camp papers, broadsheets, literary publications and
magazines, and the newspaper press.

3

6

Coulter, p.505.

4

Harrison A. Trexler, "The Davis Administration and the
Richmond Press."
Journal of Southern History,
XVI (May 1950), p.195.

4

Charles S. Sydnor, The Development of Southern
Sectionalism, 1819-1848 (Louisiana State University Press,
Louisiana Paperbacks 1968), p.228.

^James Grant, The Newspaper Press:
Its Origins - Progress And Present Position, (2 Vols., London:
Tinsley Bros., 1871),
Vol. 1, p.402.
Coulter, p.584.
On country newspapers see Thomas D. Clark,
"The Country Newspaper: A Factor in Southern Opinion
1865-1930," J.S.H. XIV (Feb. 1948), pp.3-33.

The special economic, political, geographical and cultural
traditions of the South produced a newspaper press that was quite
different from that of Europe, especially in two related respects.
It was free of government restriction and it was very diverse.

The

development of newspapers in Britain and France at the time of the
Civil Was was mostly distinguished by government suspicion and control
through censorship, libel laws, postal restrictions, and taxation.
It was not until 1861 that the newspaper duty on the English press
was removed;

in France the government’s attitude to the press was

uncompromisingly restrictive.^

But, as Daniel Boorstin wrote, "the

local variety and wide dispersion of the American newspaper press
made it extraordinarily difficult for the government to control or
restrict it ....

Who could muzzle a newspaper press that was
g
diffused into every corner of a vast continent?"

The uncompromising distrust and hatred unleashed by the war was
not enough to let the government exercise control of the Southern
press.

The dual tenets of editorial independence and freedom of the

press prevented it.

As the Index, the Confederate newspaper

published in England, noted:

"in the South the press is not only

free, but its freedom is abundantly used."

9

President

Richard D. Altick, The English Common Reader:
A Social
History of the Mass Reading Public, 1800-1900 (The
University of Chicago Press, 1957), p.354.
g
Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans:
The National Experience
(Weidenfield & Nicolson, Penguin, 1969), p.174.
^Index, 27 November, 1862.

7.
Jefferson Davis lamented with some cause a press that he thought
partisan and v e n a l . ^

The Richmond Daily Examiner was relentlessly vitriolic in its
attacks against Davis and the government, and many other Southern
papers, the Macon Daily Telegraph for example, were highly critical
of the government’s handling of the war effort.

As Coulter wrote:

Added to the malignancy of the anti-Davis newspapers
was an overzealous feeling for the freedom of the
press — the right to publish anything the editor
chose — and a lack of understanding of what might
give aid and comfort to the enemy.11

Early in the war there were signs that the press would in some
measure adopt what the government might have seen as a responsible
attitude to war reporting.

In June 1861 the Savannah Republican

published a notice that was printed in other papers:
Notice to the Press — We are requested by the military
authorities of the Confederate States to urge upon our
brethren of the press, throughout the South, the
importance of abstaining from all specific allusions to
the movement of troops.
The very wisest plans of the
government may be thwarted by an untimely or otherwise
injudicious exposure.12

^Coulter, p.503;

Trexler, p.195.

^Coulter, p.501.
12

Quoted in Columbus Daily Enquirer, 13 June, 1861.

8.
But the government and military authorities did nothing to
encourage co-operation by making it easier for the press to report
the war.

There was a lack of co-operation from the War Department,

the military commanders in the field, and the Postmaster General.

13

The newspapers were being forced to rely on the occasional official
report, leaks from army staff officers, and from Northern
newspapers.

The Columbus Daily Enquirer asked for all "proper and

correct intelligence of the war" instead of forcing the press to
"accept accounts graciously permitted to be sent to us by the Federal
authorities."

14

In addition to these restraints, in January 1862

the Confederate Congress considered passing a law that would make it
a crime to publish any news concerning military strengths or
movements.

15

There was therefore a substantial division in attitude between
the government and the press on how the war should be reported, with
the result that the Federal government received military information
from Confederate papers and civilian morale was in threat of being
undermined.

Nevertheless, the press believed deeply in the

principle of press freedom and rigorously resisted any suggestions of

13

14

H o d d m g Carter, Their Words Were Bullets;
The Southern
Press in War, Reconstruction and Peace (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1969), p.29; James W. Silver
"Propaganda in the Confederacy," J.S.H., X l (Nov. 1945),
pp.487-503;
Coulter, pp.336-337.
Columbus Daily Enquirer, 13 June, 1861.

^ I b i d . , 22 January, 1862.

9.
government involvement.

The Columbus Daily Enquirer sounded a

warning against Congressional interference:

"There is no necessity

to forfeit a particle of our freedom in carrying out this war ....
"16
Congress cannot be too cautious on a matter of such importance.
In response to General Beauregard's refusal to allow reporters
within twenty-five miles of the lines, the Mobile Register gave its
view of the importance of an independent press:
This is a war of opinion as well as arms.
If our
military Generals lead the soldiers of liberty to the
cannon's mouth on the battlefield, it is the Generals
of the Press who plan and fight the great moral battles
of the revolution.
The one deals in bayonets, bombshells,
blood and sinews, and the other marshals the spirit of the
revolution, inspires the courage and persuades to the [sic[
sacrifices of the people.
The army could no more carry
on the war of independence without the press, than the
press could spare the army; and while the Chiefs of the
Army upon the occurrence of every crisis acknowledge this
position by their free use of its moral arms, they owe to
that co-operative power of the revolution, at least
respect and common justice.17

There were also other problems facing the press.

Their teams

of reporters were inferior in size and organisation to those in the
North —
them.

18

the "Bohemian Brigade" as one historian of the press called
The established news agencies of the North were of course

no longer available to Southern newspapers.

X6

Some attempt was made

Columbus Daily Enquirer, 22 January, 1862.

^ Mobile Register & Advertiser, 29 May, 1862.

18

Louis Starr, Bohemian Brigade:
Civil War Newsmen in
Action (New York: Knopf, 1954), p.iii.

10.
to replace them after the Autumn of 1862:

the Mutual Benefit Press,

an association of the four Richmond newspapers;
Press Association;

the Confederate

the Weekly Press Association of Georgia;

the Press Association of the Confederate States.

and

Their coverage of

the Confederacy was incomplete, however, and they were established
too late.

19

The basic job of newsgetting was therefore a

substantial problem for Southern editors.

Quite late in the war,

the Macon Daily Telegraph responded to what they called "repeated
enquiries" about their sources for an article on foreign
intervention:

"We claim to have none which are not open to every

careful observer."

20

But in January 1862 another editor was

equally honest in demystifying the news business:
Editors are currently presumed to possess a special fund
of information ... and we, in common no doubt with most
of our contemporaries, have been interrogated a thousand
times ... as if our opinions were infallible.
It is
true that the press has opportunities of arriving at
information in consequence of having access to numerous
journals and correspondence, but, nevertheless, it is as
subject to error as most individuals, and its conclusions
are, therefore, not to be received with implicit trust.21

The near absence of informed government statements, the
obstructions by the military, the inadequate reporting teams, were
in a sense internal problems.

To these must be added the

accumulating effects of a defensive war;

the manifold problems are

described by Coulter:

19

20
21

Carter, pp. 32-33;

Coulter, pp.496-97.

Macon Daily Telegraph, 14 December, 1864.
New Orleans Bee, 16 January, 1862.

11.
The volunteering editors, the lack of paper, the
falling off of advertisements, the age-old difficulty
of non-payment of subscriptions, poor postal service,
the high cost of everything going into the making of
a newspaper ....22

In many cases these problems resulted in closure, and these
occurred with perhaps surprising speed.

During the first year of

the war forty papers closed in Virginia alone, and by the end of 1862
only about fourteen percent of newspapers remained in business.
North Carolina lost twenty-six papers;
sixty remained after one year of war;
forced the closure of sixty-six papers.
drastically reduced in size.

24

in Texas only ten out of
the invasion of Mississippi
23

Those that survived were

By the end of 1864 editorial morale

was at a very low ebb:
Everything is out of joint — bridges are washed away,
so that mails are interrupted, and letters and papers
delayed, and wires are down, so that telegraphic
communications are interrupted.
The few papers
received contain but little of general interest, while
there is a complete dearth of news from the army.25

These various factors aggravated the problem, but Southern
newspapers throughout the war had great difficulty in gathering
information both for news items and editorials.

The shortage of

"hard” news forced editors often to rely on conjecture, supposition,
and extrapolation.

22
23
24
25

There was a tendency for editors to use phrases

Coulter, p.493.
Ibid.
Index, 27 November, 1862;

Starr, p.iii.

Macon Daily Telegraph, 24 December, 1864.

such as:

"There are some very numerous signs which indicate a

growing conviction
deal to show that ...."j

"the English papers contain a good
information "said to be derived from

semi-official sources
Paris

"information from a gentleman in

observations from a "gentleman of the highest

reputation for talent and foresight ...."

The rumour was rife.

Every newspaper reported them and often discussed them at length.
These comments are from a single edition:
rumours —

"We have rumours on

so much smoke as seems certain to indicate fire ...."

The Canadian press "assures us that something is in the wind ...."
"The best informed correspondents of Northern papers state
26

that

Towards the end of 1862 an Alabama paper explained

that the "public entertains with a lively interest every rumour ...
[and we] think it altogether proper to lay before our readers such
'straws' that float on the current, and to allow them to judge if
they can, how the wind blows.

27

By the end of 1864 even the rumours

were drying up as the invasion disrupted communications almost
totally.

The Macon Daily Telegraph complained of the unfavourable

circumstances in which "we are deprived of all exchange papers except
in our immediate neighbourhood from which to gather news, make
selections, or catch an idea

It went on:

26
Mobile Register & Advertiser, 20 August, 1861.
^ I bid.,

7 November, 1862.

13.
the poor overtaxed editor is expected to furnish an
interesting paper with each rising sun.
He racks
his brain for something wise and witty;
he searches
his few exchanges with eagerness, and runs his
scissors remorselessly around any paragraph which
promises to be of interest.
He elaborates each
startling rumour and wakes the interest of his readers
with mysterious hints of wonderful events about to be
developed.
Those who hastily scan the columns of a
daily paper in these times, little know the labour and
anxiety it has cost in the preparation.28

Newspaper editorials in the mid-nineteenth century, as today,
did not limit themselves to facts;
ideas too.

they quite rightly dealt with

Nevertheless, the credibility of editorials must be

based on the presumption that they speak with authority, that they
are the results of informed opinion, and that they have tapped
sources of information not easily available to the reader.

For

editorials concerned with European affairs, these sources were almost
exclusively other newspapers:

Northern, Canadian, European.

This

necessarily led to a reliance on the wider newspaper fraternity for
news and opinion about the major Euro-American issues —
recognition, intervention, cotton —
incestuous dialogue among newspapers.

the blockade,

and led also to a kind of
As suggested, this must have

been at least in part the result of the dearth of alternative sources.
It was also, it might be speculated, a reflection of the esteem felt
within the fraternity for the standing and authority of the newspaper
press generally.

It seemed to be accepted implicitly that when a

newspaper spoke, it spoke also for its readership.

28

Macon Daily Telegraph, 3 December, 1864.

In America generally, the press was deeply established, from
the august papers of the seaboard states to the ’’booster press" in
the West.

29

But the South did not develop a metropolitan press

equivalent to, say, the New York Times or the Times of London.
Richmond, Virginia, with a population of roughly 38,000 in 1862 was
served by no less than five newspapers.

30

Even in this major

Southern city it was therefore possible to develop a close
relationship between the public and the highly visible and
generally political editors.

These editors were a special breed:
literati.

a kind of thuggish

James Grant, the press historian writing in 1871,

pointed to a fundamental difference between the advocacy and
vigorous language of the English press, and the "violence, often
mingled with coarseness, in the tone and terms of the daily papers"
in America.

31

Even a cursory glance at the Southern editorials

makes clear what Grant meant.

The Style is cavalier, provocative,

quarrelsome, and often irresponsible.
the attitude:

"In journalism, as in war, the attack has the

advantage over defence;

it is easier, more pleasant, and generally

more spirited and more effectual."

29

Boorstin, pp.161-174.

30c
Starr, p . v m .
31
32

The Index partly explained

Grant, p.398.
Index, 27 November, 1862.

32

The Southern people tended not

15.
to read books.

The editors therefore reached their public

through rhetoric that reflected the hustings and the pulpit.
Hodding Carter put it this way:
The Southern editors for 150 years have been spokesmen,
defenders, and firebrands in their regions to an extent
not in evidence anywhere except perhaps the old West.
They have used their type fonts as bullets, their
newsprint as musket wadding, their ink as gunpowder,
and their words as tinder.34

Many of these men were sophisticated and influential,
respected within their communities and beyond.

Charles Sydnor has

referred to the "distinguished and powerful Richmond editors" of the
1830’s and 1840's.

Thomas Ritchie, editor of the Richmond Enquirer

before his death in 1854, was described in the Index as "the father
of the Southern press."

35

He was a political "nabob” who,

according to Bernard Weisberger, "was not only a power in the
legislative caucuses but a necessary part of every public meeting,
ball, banquet in Richmond ....
were at one with him."

36

Editor, citizen, and politician

And so with the news of Fort Sumter; it

was not to the State capitol that the procession went with its
Confederate flags and torches, but to the Enquirer offices where the
crowd was addressed by one of the editors.

37

The Enquirer’s rival,

^Sydnor, p.306.
^Carter, p.l.
“^Sydnor, p.228;
36

37

Index, 27 November, 1862.

Bernard A. Weisberger, The American Newspaperman
(The University of Chicago Press, 1961), p.69.
Alfred Hoyt Bill, The Beleagured City:Richmond 1861
- 1865 (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p.39.

16.
the Examiner, had its editorial powerhouse in John Moncure Daniel,
described as "half genius, half misanthrope" who produced with his
editors, including Edward A. Pollard, a hard-hitting, erratic, and
often fanatical newspaper.

38

These

Southern editors were not always

self-made entrepreneurs or grass-roots politicos.

John Forsyth,

editor of the Mobile Register, apart from being a distinguished
newspaperman was a former minister to Mexico and representative in
the Alabama legislature.

39

Captain ObadiahWise, described by

Trexler as an "editorial personality" during his period with the
Enquirer was the son of a former governor of Virginia,
Henry A. Wise.

40

Another editor of the Enquirer, Jennings Wise,

studied at Heidelberg, was attached to the American legation in
Berlin, and had bean secretary of the legation in P a n s .

41

The newspapers produced by men like these varied in style and
quality.

They included papers like the New Orleans Bee and the

Mobile Register which were moderate and balanced;
Dispatch, a "popular" newspaper;

the Examiner —

the Richmond
the Ishmael —

said

by the Index to be against everybody, "all parties, all men, and we
may say, all measures."

38
39

40
41

42

There were many hundreds more serving the

Trexler, p.181.
Charles P. Cullop, Confederate Propaganda m Europe,
1861-1865 (Coral Gables; University of Miami, 1969), p.20.
Trexler, p.178.
Bill, p.16.

^Index, 27 November, 1862.

17.
Confederacy, the smallest community as well as the cities.

Every

citizen had access to a paper of some kind, from the county
weeklies to one of the plethora of dailies.

The paper served not

only the purchaser and the immediate family, but possibly changed
hands and, through discussion, was transmitted orally to a wider
public.

According to a contemporary observer, the editors were
independent m

their opinions and free from vested interests.

They were also provincial.

43

They were influenced by the communities

they served, and in turn sought to influence those communities:
is a natural relationship in journalism.

it

According to

Hodding Carter, the Southern press "demonstrated closer
identification with the aspirations of their regions than have those
of any other part of the United States."

44

And during this period

when a monolithic issue dominated the Confederacy, when every area
of life —

public, personal, social, economic —

was touched by it,

the relationship between the press and the public must have been
closer than in more normal times.

The newspapers most often were

the only means available to supply the public’s need for information,
and it is the raison d'etre of journalists to pose the questions that
their readership wants answered.

43

44

Daniel Boorstin makes this point

T.C. DeLeon, Four Years in Rebel'Capitals: An Inside
View of Life in the Southern Confederacy, from Birth
To Death (Mobile, 1890), pp.288-89, quoted in Trexler,
p.178.
Carter, p.l.

18.
in the preface to Bernard Weisberger*s book on American
newspapermen s
The unexpected
newspaperman’s
the living and
daily concerns

current of daily life define the
subjects for him .... (he] writes about
for the living .... [He] records the
of his age .... 45

During the Civil War the newspapers were, as might be
expected, absorbed by the same issues.
views on specific problems.

There were divergences of

But they were united in the broadest

sense, and as James Grant suggested in 1871, they had the power to
affect public opinion in a direct way:
Public opinion, not only politically and morally, but
socially, is powerfully influenced in all countries by
the tone of their public journals.
It is impossible
it could be otherwise;
for the community in every
country must, however unconsciously, imbibe the spirit
of the newspapers which they daily read.46

The Confederate press was far from elitist.
speak only for the civil and military worthies.
it.

It did not want to
In fact, far from

Its voice was most often populist, critical of authority,

impatient, cantankerous at times, and quick to react to events.
In these desperate times it was not always rational or consistent.
But the important point is that the newspapers were a part of a
two-way process;

45

46

the communication cycle was a complete one.

Daniel Boorstin, Preface to The American Newspaperman,
p.viii.
Grant, p.402.

19.
Hotze, Confederate propagandist and editor of the Index, subtly
and succinctly summed up the influence of the press:
The Southern press ... is representative.
It
does not seek to make, but to feed and direct
public opinion.
Still, it is not a mere
delegate, but exercises a controlling influence
over that which gives it power and vitality.47

^Index, 27 November, 1862.

CHAPTER 11
A STRICT AND IMPARTIAL NEUTRALITY

Britain’s wartime relationship with the Confederacy started on
13 May, 1861 with Queen Victoria's Proclamation of Neutrality to
Parliament, and became common knowledge a few days later when the
Southern newspapers published the text:
whereas hostilities have unhappily commenced
between the Government of the United States of
America and certain States styling themselves the
Confederate States of America ... we, being at
peace with the Government of the United States,
have declared our royal determination to maintain
a strict and impartial neutrality in the contest
between the said contending parties ....

Even as the Proclamation was being read, the Richmond Whig
was preparing for print an editorial which claimed that "we may very
safely look for recognition as soon as we want."

And three days

later, it expressed the view that England was preparing a "world of
trouble for Old Abe and Seward," suggesting that direct government
by "the amiable and accomplished lady who rules the British Empire"
was not an impossibility.'*'

Britain's declaration of neutrality was followed by similar
declarations from France, Spain, Russia, Brazil and the Netherlands.

^Richmond Whig, 13 May, 1861;

ibid., 17 May, 1861.

21 .
The web of interacting links and rivalries ensured a concerted
response to Britain's decision which itself was based on
realpolitik, made all the more solid because in this matter the
Conservative opposition was aligned with the Liberal government’s
thinking.

2

This alignment and, as James Baxter affirms, the logic

of national self-interest —

military, commercial, territorial —

ensured "the highest standards of neutral performance."

3

Therefore, a month after Sumter and two months before First
Manassas the political and military reality of Europe's place in the
Civil War had been firmly established.

At least the European

powers recognised "the self-evident fact of the existence of a war,"
Jefferson Davis wrote later.
greatly disappointed.

But, of course, the Confederates were

As Jefferson Davis put it, "the neutral

nations of Europe pursued a policy which, nominally impartial, was
practically most favourable to our enemies and most detrimental to

The press were more direct in their language.

English

neutrality was, claimed the Whig, "tantamount to intervention in
favour of the North" and that "British neutrality amount to an

2

Henry Blumenthal, "Confederate Diplomacy:
Popular
Notions and International Realities," J .S .H . XXX11
(1966), pp.166-167.

3
James Baxter, "The British Government and Neutral Rights,"
A.H.R. XXXIV (Oct. 1928), p.9.
4
Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate
Government, 2 vols.
(London:
Longmans, Green & Co.,
1881), 1:376,369.

22 .
Anglo-Yankee alliance."'*
the war.

This sentiment was expressed throughout

In May 1863 the Macon Daily Telegraph published an

editorial that reflected a growing anger and frustration:
Of all the humbug, the greatest, undoubtedly, is
English neutrality.
The impudence and audacity
with which the English Government and English
writers have maintained, that they have held a strict
neutral position in reference to the Federals and
Confederates, have been remarkable even for the
English hypocrisy.6

The anger lasted through to the end of the war when the
Macon Daily Telegraph declared that Britain's objective was to
"disable both

sides , and to build up its own fortunes on their

common ruin."^

It may not have been Britain's conscious policy to aid the
North, but there were sound reasons for the South believing it to be
so.

Robert Huhn Jones in his work on Anglo-American relations

states that "for better or worse," neutrality benefited the North,
g

and indeed Britain also.

The Confederate press believed that the

North exerted pressure on Britain:

the Yankees got away with

interrupting British shipping "as if it were a Chinese junk;"
prevented Confederate ships being built in Britain;

they

they were able

^Richmond Whig, 19 March, 1862;
ibid., 19 April, 1862.
£
Macon Daily Telegraph, 14 May, 1863.
^Ibid., 7 April, 1865.
g
Robert Huhn Jones, "Anglo-American Relations, 1861-1865
Reconsidered," Mid-America XIV (January, 1963),
pp.36-49.
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to recruit m

England and Ireland.

9

It was claimed also that

although the Confederates had privateers, they were not, as was the
North, allowed to use British colonial ports;

and while the North

was able to import from Britain openly, the South was n o t . ^
Richmond Whig offered a homily:

The

British neutrality was only fine

words, but "fine words butter no parsnips."^

The Richmond Daily

Examiner in an editorial dated 14 May 1862, went further in
accusing Britain, and other European powers, of double standards

and

of favouring the North even to their own disadvantage:
[while]
... permitting the South to be cut off from
relations with jEurope] they have opened their
armories, foundries and vast stores of military
material to the Northern adversary.
The result is
now before them.
The Southern navy has been
annihilated .... Their jthe European powers*] maritime
rival ...
is without a competitor in American waters.
If those governments had observed the role of strict
and absolute impartiality, giving the South the same
facilities for procuring war materials .... the
maritime interests of Europe would have had a
powerful adjunct and support in American waters.
Therefore, to the extent that neutrality was an accepted fact
it was perceived as uneven in its application.

It was not totally

accepted by the Southern press as a firm and unalterable policy.
Periodically the newspapers

referred to neutrality as if surprised

that it actually existed.

There seemed to be a feeling that it

was

only a matter of time before the brutal reality of a cotton dearth

9
Macon Daily Telegraph, 14 May, 1863.
^^Richmond Whig, 6 January, 1863.
^ I b i d . , 19 April, 1862.
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would force Europe, and particularly England, into some kind of
intervention.

This is an understandable attitude since to believe

firmly that Europe was permanently committed to neutrality as
Britain had defined it was logically to accept the fact that there
would be no recognition of independence nor a rejection of the
blockade.

Blockading the Confederacy was the North’s first major
strategic manoeuvre, and it was a psychological as well as an
economic and military blow to the Confederacy.

According to

Gordon Wright, discussion of this issue was "woven through most-of
the [French] consular reports during the w a r . " ^

Certainly the

Confederate press was consumed with the blockade and placed the very
highest priority on it being lifted.
isolation;

They did not see it in

recognition was also a matter of the greatest concern.

The blockade was a tangible matter and an affront, and that gave to
it an immediacy that the perhaps more abstract political concept of
recognition did not have.

In any case, the press believed that if

Europe could be induced to raise the blockade it would mean, ipso
facto, that neutrality was at an end, and that the path was open to
recognition.

The Confederate press believed that the blockade was illogical,
illegal and ineffective.

12

It was illogical because if it was true,

.

Gordon Wright, "Economic Conditions m the Confederacy
as Seen by the French Consuls," J.S.H. VII (May, 1941),
p.198.

as the North claimed, that the Union was intact and therefore
Washington had jurisdiction over the South, then the Northern
government was blockading its own ports.
illegal by precedent:

13

The blockade was

the New Orleans Bee made the point that both

the United States and Great Britain opposed the King of Naples when
he blockaded his ports during a rebellion.

It was illegal also

because of precedents in international law:

the Declaration of

Paris established the principle that a blockade would be binding
only if it were effective, and the South denied this to be the
case.

14

The press made much of their claim that the blockade was

ineffective because this was the real key to persuading the
European nations to break it.

They proffered an argument that

sought to combine a call for justice with the prospect of practical
advantage for Europe and the South.

Because the blockade was

ineffective, so went the argument, it was right that Europeans
should judge it a "paper blockade" and therefore ignore it.

By so

doing, European shipping would enter Southern ports, thus further
substantiating its ineffectiveness, deliver much needed goods, and
collect cotton equally important for European industry.

With the

right incentive England would brush aside the blockade as though it
were "a mere cobweb", claimed a Georgian p l a n t e r . ^

13

14
15

Columbus Daily Enquirer, 30 December, 1861. See also
Richmond Examiner, 22 August, 1861;
New Orleans Bee,
18 May, 1861, and 4 January, 1862.
New Orleans Bee, 4 January, 1862.
Columbus Enquirer, 12 June, 1861.

26.
During the opening months of the war, the Confederate press was
optimistic about the blockade.

Much was made of the published

views of leading personalities such as Lord Grenville and Lord Lyon.
Lord John Russell was quoted as having said "distinctly and
emphatically" that the blockade had to be effective if it was to be
respected.

Therefore, claimed the Richmond Whig, the "paper

blockade" which Seward proposed to establish would be treated with
universal contempt.

X6

In the view of the Confederacy the very

extent of the task of blockading two thousand miles of coastline
"with the numerous inlets from the James River to the Savannah" was
nothing short of laughable.^

It was possible, however, for the Northern forces to blockade
specific ports at certain times.
Hiawatha

Therefore, when the British bark

was captured at the mouth of the River James the

Richmond Whig raised the question whether the blockade could be
effective if only part of the coast was closed.

18

Naturally, during the first months of the war the Southern
press interpreted the cases of reported blockade busting as proof
positive that the blockade was ineffective, and often they
overstated the likely outcome.

When the

Alliance , another British

^ Richmond Whig, 25 May, 1861.
^ Richmond Daily Examiner, 13 August, 1861.
18
Richmond Whig, 30 October, 1861.
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vessel, reached the port of Beaufort in North Carolina in
August 1861 "without let or hindrance" it was enough, without any
doubt, to declare that legally and practically the blockade ceased
to exist.

19

This kind of response was possible because it was

believed that if Europe knew that the blockade was ineffective such
a climate of unease and irritation would be created to ensure
intervention.

20

According to the Richmond Daily Examiner the

result of such an intervention would be swift and total;
British merchants will immediately send to the
Southern ports vessels laden with such stores as
they may suppose most saleable in the country, and
commissioned to bring back cargoes of tobacco and
cotton.
Should the government of the United
States be mad enough to interfere with any one of
them, ... the event will bring upon it the
maritime force of the civilized world .... In a
couple of months more we may, therefore, reasonably
anticipate the re-opening of European commerce;
and
the consequence .,, can scarcely be too highly
stated ....21

The "consequence" was expected to be a European attitude of
"peace at any price."

But this was the high point of King Cotton’s

reign, during the first six months or so of 1861.

Later in 1861 and

in early 1862, the period of military reverses following First
Manassas, the mood shifted from confidence to doubt.

Specific

cases of successful blockade running were reported, such as the

19

20
21

Richmond Examiner, 30 August, 1861.
New Orleans Bee, 18 May, 1861;
1 August, 1861.

Richmond Whig,

Richmond Examiner, 30 August, 1861.
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"Bermuda” at Savannah in November 1861, and newspapers like the
New Orleans Bee and the Richmond Whig drew on "accurate
statistics" to report five hundred cases of blockade busting.
But the so called "paper blockade" remained.
became introspective:

22

The Columbus Enquirer

"We boast that ’Cotton is King’ but an

inefficient and feeble blockade now strips this commercial monarch
of his power ...."

23

The New Orleans Bee looked outwards:

The blockade is notoriously ineffective and illegal,
and as such is not entitled to the respect of
Neutral powers .... We cannot possibly believe that
the principal nations of Europe will much longer
brook so insufferable a wrong, and so vital an
injury to their commerce.24

In July 1861, the Columbus Daily Enquirer expressed a common
sentiment that can best be described as an optimism blended with
sharp political realism.
inevitable.

The raising of the blockade was

The economic collapse of the cotton trade would bring

pressure on the French and especially the British.

The "simple

question" for these governments to ponder was:
whether they will soonest procure the freedom of the
cotton trade in permitting the United States speedily
to crush the Southern ’rebellion’ or by assisting the
Southerners to raise the blockade.25

22
23
24
25

New Orleans Bee, 15 November, 1861 and 17 February, 1862.
Columbus Enquirer, 7 November, 1861.
New Orleans Bee, 31 December, 1861.
Columbus Enquirer, 8 July, 1861.
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The frequent demand for justice, either in international law or
by some ill-defined standard of morality, was little more than
rhetoric.

What really underpinned the confidence of the

Confederate press was a belief in the power of mutual interest:
They want our staple, we want theirs [manufactured
products^.
They have command of the ocean — they
can break Lincoln's blockade in twenty-four hours,
let them do it.26

This notion was not quite as starkly put as that of King Cotton,
but it was only a step away.

The tone of the press suggested

incredulity, and England and France rather than the Confederacy were
placed in the role of victims.

The blockade was described as a

"pistol at the breasts of ten million Frenchmen and Englishmen."
The North, it was claimed, was in "covert war" against the
European powers.

It was therefore "probable" that Mfor their own

interest and necessities" England and France would raise the
blockade.

27

The Richmond Whig asked:

How long under the inexorable pressure of events will
England maintain her present tone of moderation?
Will it be when her tobacco revenue is extinguished
and Lancashire cries aloud for cotton, or will her
policy now be what it ever has been from the consolara
del mare, down to the present hour, to measure her
regard for maritime law precisely by the exigencies of
her commercial position.28

26
Richmond Whig, 20 May, 1861.
27

28

Richmond Examiner, 12 July, 1861, 13 July, 1861;
Orleans Bee, 24 August, 1861.
Richmond Whig, 21 June, 1861.

New
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By the winter of 1861— 62 the newspapers were publishing more
widely the view that Europe was unlikely to risk war with the North
over the blockade.

In a number of articles beginning in December

1861 the Macon Daily Telegraph questioned the assumption that
Europe would intervene to break the blockade, until in
February 1862 it admitted that "we ought now finally dismiss the
idea of having the blockade broken this spring."

29

In November 1861

the New Orleans Bee expressed a growing disillusionment, and perhaps
maturity:

The South should

defeat the enemy and raise the blockade ... without
the slightest reference to the policy of foreign
nations.
We have already dallied too much with
precious time, in the childish hope that Europe would
loose the Gordian knot which it is our business to
cut with the sword.30

29
30

Macon Daily Telegraph, 5 December, 1861;
New Orleans Bee, 26 November, 1861.

15 February, 1862.

CHAPTER 111
THE FRAGILE OPTIMISM

Repudiation of the blockade, and therefore rejection of
neutrality as the British had defined it, was one way the South
hoped Europe might intervene in the Civil War.

There were others:

recognition of Southern independence, mediation for a favourable end
to hostilities, and, most extreme, armed intervention on behalf of
the Confederacy.

One diplomatic initiative, not actively sought by

the Southern press, was the belligerent status declared by Britain
and France in May 1861.

This caused little interest in the press

for the good reason, pointed out by E. Merton Coulter, that it
amounted to "nothing more than recognition that a war rather than a
street fight was in progress and that the rules of war were now in
effect

The Trent affair probably more than any other single event gave
justification for the belief that Britain would end her neutrality
and in some way assist the Confederacy, most likely by declaring war

^Coulter, p.187.

32.
against the Union.

2

In this, as in other moments of high hopes,

the Confederate press expressed a fragile optimism that did not
easily survive the stress of changing circumstances.

The Trent affair was, said the Macon Daily Telegraph, the
North's "maddest prank" and for which Britain was bound to demand
redress.

The Columbus Daily Enquirer had, it claimed, despaired

that Britain would ever interfere with the blockade but believed
that she could not "submit to this act of the Lincoln government."
It was, said the Richmond Enquirer, "impossible for the English
government, without disgrace, to fail to enact the fullest
reparation."

3

And the New Orleans Bee which on the whole gave the

most sophisticated analysis of the crisis, believed, at least in the
early days, that Britain would "demand prompt and complete
reparation, in default of which she will be ready to launch the
thunderbolts of war."

4

The Trent affair was the incident in which the ship
carrying Jefferson Davis' commissioners, James Mason and
John Slidell, who were bound for Europe to argue the
Confederate cause, was stopped by the Union warship San
Jacinto and the commissioners arrested.
The incident was
known by the name of the British ship, Trent.
3
Macon Daily Telegraph, 19 December, 1861;
Columbus
Enquirer, 19 November, 1861; Richmond Enquirer,
19 November, 1861.
4

New Orleans Bee, 27 November, 1861.
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All the newspapers used the rhetoric of war, seeking to give
the British a reason for joining the hostilities:

the capture of a

British ship was an insult to British honour, it showed disrespect
for the British flag, it was a profound indignity, and it was an
offence against international law.

An enthusiastic editorial in

the Richmond Enquirer sums up the tenor of the press during this
period:
We rejoice that it was put into
to insult the British flag ....
John Bull has put down his head
horns.
We rejoice to hear the
Lion in an honest cause.5

the minds of Wilkes
And we rejoice that
and levelled his
roar of the English

There was also a balanced and thoughtful side to Confederate
journalism.

This was to be found in, among others, the

Columbus Enquirer.

It pointed out that Britain would not act out

of a hysterical sense of battered pride.

If it was in herinterest

to make war against the North she would do so and neither
international law nor "old foggy precepts or learned dissertations
£
would stand in her way."
The New Orleans Bee took the view that
although Britain had suffered "a most gross and shameful indignity"
she was foremost a "political nation" and before taking action would
have to be convinced that the stability of her government or the
welfare of her people were threatened.

The Trent affair merely

^Richmond Enquirer, 20 December, 1861.
Columbus Enquirer, 25 November, 1861, 20 December, 1861.
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offered a "justifiable pretext*' should Britain want to raise the
blockade, and on the whole this was thought unlikely.^

The attitude and response of the North was of course the
crucial factor in the outcome of the affair.

The Richmond Examiner

expressed the view that **the North is furious for war with England.
The

British Lion is to be subdued;

match;

John Bull has now found his
g
the mission of the United States is to put him down."

A

week later the paper had modified its position to one that was more
widely held in the press:
Alas!
We areforced to the painful confession,
that
amid all their lunacy, and in the midst of their
wildest frenzy, the Northern nation have steadily and
consistently preserved untouched one trait of their
ordinary character and natural disposition.
It is
their cowardice.
Sane or mad, drunk or sober, they
are always the same pusillanimous poltroons.9

Neither Britain nor the North wanted confrontation.

The

Confederate press expressed a bitter disappointment in an avalanche
of invective.
apology**;

The North had given an "infamous and unconditional

it was the "most ignominious back-down ever perpetrated

by any nation of respectable power";

the Union was guilty of

"fawning sycophancy" a n d “miserable cowardice";
deep "humiliation."^

it had suffered a

The New Orleans Bee ranted:

^New Orleans Bee, 20 November, 1861, 4 December, 1861.
g
Richmond Examiner, 20 December, 1861.
9

Ibid., 27 December, 1861.

"^Richmond Whig, 4 January, 1862; Macon Daily Telegraph,
27 December, 1861;
New Orleans Bee, 4 February, 1862.
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when the British Lion growled and showed his
teeth, we expected that the Yankee jackle would put
his tail between his legs, lower his crest and lick
the dust in abject humility, and this is exactly
what he has done.11

The outcome of the Trent affair weakened the prospect of
British interference with the blockade.

The earlier optimism of

the Confederate press was based in the belief that Britain needed
the cotton supply at any cost, and this proved to be untrue.
press responded in three ways.

The

The weakest response was to suggest

that the European powers might yet raise the blockade.

Another was

to urge retribution through a refusal to plant new cotton crops and
destroy stocks.

Two motives governed the latter response.

Firstly, the psychological need to strike out at Europe:
should our people insanely plant cotton?

’’Why

The blockade is upon us,

fixed and fastened for an indefinite length of time.

Intervention

by Foreign States is dead, if it ever had any vitality."

Secondly,

as a possible shock that "might startle France and England from their
apathy," through knowledge that "not a single bale of cotton or a
pound of tobacco will be allowed to leave Southern ports for Europe
until those ports are open to the commerce of nations by the
raising of the blockade."

12

The third reason for the press response

~^New Orleans Bee, 3 January, 1862.
^^Macon Daily Telegraph, 26 February, 1862;
Bee, 13 March, 1862.

New Orleans

36.
was allied to the last, but it encouraged the South to continue the
war without foreign assistance:
It has taken much time and many pregnant facts to
convince our countrymen that they must win their own
battles .... Not without many a fond and lingering
look across the Atlantic have they slowly and
reluctantly abandoned the once sanguine hopes of a
speedy interference.13

The government and the Confederate press placed a great store
on British recognition, and a vast number of editorials
concentrated attention on the question.

Undoubtedly the advantages

to the Confederacy would have been enormous.

Diplomatic channels

would have opened and, as Coulter points out, the trading and
commercial opportunities would have been of "inestimable value."

14

But the press seemed to put comparatively little importance on these
effects, tending to emphasize the psychological advantages:
It will be nothing less than the deliberate and
solemn judgement of the nations according it, that
the Confederate States are, and of right ought to
be, free, sovereign and independent- - that they
cannot be subjugated— and that the war ought to
[cease).
Such action by England and France and
the other chief powers, foreshadowed by an almost
unanimous popular sentiment ... would confront
our enemy with the public opinion of the world.15

13
14
15

New Orleans Bee, 2 April, 1862.
Coulter, pp.188-89.
Richmond Whig, 6 August, 1862.
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The positive conviction that recognition would be achieved was
energetically held, although short lived, and it was held partly
from a sense of desperations

"There is no possible compromise, no

alternative between our extermination, and our recognition as a free
and sovereign nation."

X6

The British and French press, although

unpredictable in their support, were a source of much comfort to
those in the South.

The early military successes during the

Peninsular Campaign added to the sense of optimism.
Macon Daily Telegraph of 7 July 1862s

To quote the

"The Battle of Richmond, will

remove the least doubt of our ability to maintain ourselves, and
Europe will wait on the Lincolnites no longer for c o t t o n . A n d
the belief in cotton itself gave strength:
rely on our impregnable position —

"We can ...

very safely

on the command of which our

products hold over the vital interests of the British Empire, for as
speedy a recognition as we may desire."

18

By August 1861 the mood

was set:
We ask no aid to handle this rampant fanaticism of the
North;
single handed we can subdue and shackle it in
its confines beyond the Mason and Dixon's line;
by the
sword we can win and hold our independence, and now that
we have shown that we can do so, we may demand our
recognition of foreign powers as their equals among
nations, not as the dependents of their magnanimity.19

^ New Orleans Bee, 27 June, 1861.
^ Macon Daily Telegraph,
18
19

7 July, 1862.

Richmond Whig, 23 May, 1861.
Mobile Register, 20 August, 1861.
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Blumenthal calls this "the period of 'sanguine expectations'"
which is apt indeed.

20

By the winter of 1861-62 there was,

however, the start of a discernible shift away from complete
optimism towards doubt, and with that an antagonism towards Britain
that at times was brutal in its force and vitriolic in its language.
The Mobile Register asked in February 1862:
Why has she not recognised us?
Why has she, an eminently
selfish power in her policy, resisted every inducement
of interest, every incitement of passion stimulated by the
hostile deportment of the North, and thus long refused to
us a common right and justice ....?

In answer to this rhetorical question, the issue of slavery was
brought into the open:

"It is because we are a 'peculiar people' —

peculiar as the Israelites were of old among the surrounding
Gentiles."

21

The Mobile Register thundered against the "government

of Great Britain, and the sickly sentimental cant of abolitionism."
"Exeter Hallism is triumphant" it claimed, with reference to the
British abolitionist movement in England.

Palmerston was berated:

"The terrible filthy thing of slavery comes betwixt the wind and the
gentility of my Lord ...
South ...."

when he is obliged to approach the

The editorial went on:

Henry Blumenthal, A Reappraisal of Franco-American
Relations, 1830-1871 (Chapel Hill:
The University
of North Carolina Press, 1959), p.158.

21

Mobile Register, 2 February, 1862.
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We may expect no favour, not even right.
We are
a ’peculiar people' — a slaveocracy, beyond the
pale of human sympathies ....
There is no help
for us but in our own might and the favour of
heaven ....
Let us shut our eyes to all the
outside world, and fight out our destiny without
looking beyond the points of our bayonets.
If
the rest of the world will have nothing to do with
us, let us have nothing to do with it ....22

By the summer of 1862 a tired resignation seemed to weigh on
the Southern press.
say:

In June

the Richmond Examiner went sofar

’’Recognition of a government that is struggling

of death is a diplomatic impossibility.”

23

as to

in theagonies

The next month the

Columbus Daily Enquirer summed up this new feeling:
Human governments are not institutions of benevolence
....
They care very little about the interests of
each other ....
All the complaints, therefore, about
the tardiness of England and France to recognise the
independence of the South, are mere reflections of the
world we live in.24

By the autumn of 1862 there was little optimism left.

The press

looked for a "cogent” reason why Britain would recognise the
Confederacy, and none was forthcoming.

At about this time the

Southern press began to consider more closely the position of France.
In a sense this was understandable.

Napoleon had made clear his

wish to recognise the Confederacy, and the Confederate commissioners
received a much warmer welcome in Paris than in London.

22Ibid., 11 March, 1862.
23
24

Richmond Examiner, 17 June, 1862.
Columbus Daily Enquirer, 17 July, 1862.

But to turn

40.
to France at this time must have been more symbolic as a rejection
of Britain than a realistic expectation of French action, since it
had been made absolutely clear that France would recognise the
Confederacy only if Britain acted first.

Even when Slidell offered

the French major trading advantages, including free cotton,
Napoleon dared not act alone.

25

The Confederate press understood the political situation in
Europe and realised there were major problems in the way of a
favourable response, although it was not often stated explicitly.
It was implicit, however, in the strategy they adopted towards
Napoleon:

a mixture of flattery and enticement.

Napoleon was now

referred to as "sagacious,** "clear headed", and ‘Imtethered" by
ideology.

He could readily be "brought to see the immense

advantages, which could be accrued to France from a close and
exclusive commercial alliance with the Southern States.*'

26

From the spring of 1862 through the following winter, this
complex balancing of attitudes continued towards, on the one hand, a
discredited Britain whose support was still begrudgingly sought and,
on the other, to France which was viewed, despite the rhetoric, very
much as a less attractive prospect.

The final stage was when

France too was found wanting, and the accusing finger was pointed at
the whole map of Europe.

^Coulter, pp.185-190.
26
Richmond Whig, 5 February, 1862.

The rationale for expecting French assistance was based on two
factors:

first, that the special commercial relationship would save

the French clothing industry and, second, that Napoleon’s adventure
in Mexico would

be strengthened if he had a friendly ally as

neighbour.

that basis, the Mobile Register looked forward, as it

On

a

obliquely put it, to ’’early and important revelations from abroad.”

27

The Columbus Enquirer cautioned its readers not to "overestimate the
value of recognition by such a power as France” while accepting the
fact that there would be enormous advantages should it be achieved.

28

Britain and other European powers might follow with recognition.
The confidence of the South would be greatly enhanced, as the North's
would be diminished.

The North's threat that war would follow

recognition would be tested and

During the

found empty.

autumn of 1862, however, the press seemed tobelieve

that European assistance was improbable.
offered:

Consolation was now

non-recognition at least meant there were no obligations

which the South would have to honour in the future.

29

The presence of British consuls accredited to the United States
and still in the South became acutely irritating, and virtually all
the press favoured their expulsion.
was the summer of 1863.

27
28
29

The period of greatest concern

Later in that same summer and early in the

Mobile Register, 18 April, 1862.
Weekly Columbus Enquirer, 24 June, 1862.
Columbus Enquirer, 13 September, 1862.
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autumn the very much more serious issue emerged when the Confederate
Commissioner to England was treated with coolness by Lord Palmerston:
"It must be a source of bitter humiliation to every Southern heart
to contemplate the spectacle of a Southern Commissioner, hat in
hand, obsequiously begging English abolitionists to recognise the
Southern Confederacy."

30

The Mobile Register summed up nicely the

attitude now widely held by the Southern press:

"We have happily

done with Old England as well as New England, and neither expect nor
ask nor require recognition from one or the other."

31

A very low point had been reached in the Confederate editor^1
relations with Britain.

The press believed that the Confederacy

had suffered a massive diplomatic failure over the issue of
recognition;

the apparently off-hand treatment of their commissioner

only served to deepen the resentment.

The enormous military

disasters of Gettysburg and Vicksburg added to the feelings of
despair.

Since Britain, far more than France, was blamed for

prolonging the war it is not surprising that the press spared no
quarter in condemning a nation that had, to all intent and purpose,
become an enemy.

The Richmond Whig was the most consistent and aggressive
of Britain during this period.

30
31

Of the many editorials, one

Richmond Whi g , 3 August, 1863.
Mobile Register, 21 October, 1863.

critic
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published in July 1863 expressed the anger best.

Far from

wishing the war would end, Britain wanted it to continue for as long
as possible.
They gave no place to consideration of humanity,
of chivalry, of kindred blood.
They are governed
solely by the cold, callous and calculating policy
of self-advantage.
Blood and tears may flow in
torrents;
roofs that cover sleeping women and
children may flame from the brand of the
incendiary;
famine may gnaw at the hearts of the
innocent and helpless;
the demonized slave may be
fired to acts of unmentionable horror — what cares
the great Christian nation of Great Britain for all
this!
It is in her interest that the terrible
work should go on!
The speaking of a word might
end it all, and because it might she will not speak
the word .... 32

In editorial after editorial the anti-British message was
relentlessly restated and, as if to intensify the attacks, the
French were elevated to a sublime and, given the French political
and military ambitions, absurd level of purity and good intent.
Thus, in juxtaposition to Britain’s self-interest was placed French
virtue:
The Emperor of the French, whose heart is yet
capable of human sensibility, and can be touched
as well by sympathy with manly suffering as by
admiration for heroic conduct — who thinks it
would be 'a shame to the civilization of the age'
to stand idly by, when such inhumanities are
going on and when a gallant and proud race, fighting
only for what is their own right of birth, have made
good in the face of the world their claim to
independence — desires to end the wholesale butchery
of human beings, and to receive into the family of
nations a people whose manhood has been so nobly
asserted.33

"^Richmond Whig, 31 July, 1863.
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From late summer 1863, for reasons mentioned in the first
chapter, newspapers published less copy.

34

This practical

situation combined with a lessening interest in foreign intervention
as a practicable notion meant greatly fewer references in what
remained of the Southern press about foreign involvement in the war.
A limp suggestion that France might yet recognise the Confederacy as
a part of the Mexican "adventure*' was made at the end of 1864 by the
Macon Daily Telegraph, one of the few Confederate papers still
publishing.

But it was a "feeble ray" that started as a rumour and

35
was third-hand by the time it was published by the Telegraph.
Richmond Examiner published what must have been one of the final
statements, reprinted in the Mobile Register in March 1865, which
stated that Europe as a whole had let down the Confederacy:
Foreign nations have been without emotion [in] this
irrepressible conflict forced upon us, and without
intervention have permitted it to be carried on in
violation of the usages of civilized warfare for
four years.
Other nations have been recognised by
them upon far less evidence of capacity to maintain
their independence than we have exhibited — nations
possessing fewer of the elements of national greatness
that we possess — and yet, to this day, our
independence is not recognised.36

Mediation was from time to time seriously considered both by
Britain and France and, according to Henry Blumenthal, the
Confederate government became increasingly interested as the war

^ S e e pp.10-11.
35
36

Macon Daily Telegraph, 28 December, 1864.
Reprinted in Mobile Register, 20 March, 1865.

The
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seemed to drag endlessly on.

37

This interest was not reflected m

the press, although it was discussed during the lean period in
Confederate fortunes in the spring of 1862.

However, the attitudes

varied from caution to outright opposition.

It was felt to be more

a matter for foreign governments to dwell on than for the combatants.
The timing was for foreigners to decide, and the rules were theirs
also.

For the Southerner, mediation implied stalemate which they

would not want to admit.

It implied compromise, to which the

Richmond Whig had "but one answer —

eternal opposition.

No

compromise, no peace, until every foot of territory south of Mason
and Dixon's line is abandoned by the Yankees ...."

38

The popular feelings about foreign involvement in the war
followed three chronological, although necessarily overlapping,
stages.

The first was a state of high optimism which lasted from

the outset of war through the summer of 1861;

the second was the

search for an explanation as to why there was no involvement,
especially recognition, which lasted from the summer of 1861 to
about the end of 1862;

the final stage was the realisation, taking

different forms, that Europe would not get involved.

37
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Blumenthal, Confederate Diplomacy, pp.158-159.
Richmond Whig, 28 March, 1862;
17 April, 1862.

Richmond Examiner,

CHAPTER IV
THE GREAT CONTROLLING CONSIDERATION OF SELF-INTEREST

"King Cotton" was not an inappropriate term for a staple crop
that could dominate a culture in the way that cotton did in the
South.

It was the essence of the political economy.

More than

this, Southerners believed that cotton supported the economies of
the major European nations, especially Britain, and that it was
therefore a crucial factor in maintaining social and political
stability.

The tragic miscalculation was the belief that the

power of "King Cotton" could mould international affairs;

that,

when the chips were down, Europe could be cajoled, bribed or bullied
into actively supporting the Confederacy.

This attitude has been criticised, with justification, by
historians as "naive", "preposterous", "ludicrous", and so on.^
Nevertheless, cotton was enormously important to the British
economy.

As Cullop points out, textiles were England’s most

important industry, and the South supplied eighty per cent of the
cotton needed to sustain it.

2

Furthermore, a glance at the English

Cullop, Confederate Propaganda, p.135.
Edward Albert Pollard, The Lost Cause;
A New Southern
History of the War of the Confederacy (New York:
E.B.
Treat & Co., 1867), pp.130-131.

2

Cullop, p.11.
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press of the period will indicate that this attitude was as firmlyheld by the English as the Southerners.

As Owsley said, it was

•'the English leaders themselves who contributed most to convincing
the Southern people that England's very existence seemed to depend
upon the cotton of the South.

3

Every Southern newspaper time and

again quoted from English papers to indicate that the cotton dearth
was cutting deep.

In the New Orleans Bee of 22 October 1862 the

leader headline was "THE DISTRESS IN ENGLAND**, and this opening
paragraph was typical of newspaper opinion:
The latest accounts received from England show that
the distress in the cotton districts continue to
increase, from week to week.
Day after day mills
have been shortening the time for which they kept at
work;
and although not so frequently, yet with
consistency, others were closing altogether.

The Southern press quoted freely from a wealth of English
papers all of which gave substance to the *'King Cotton** philosophy:
as one English newspaper claimed, the alternative colonial source
of cotton, India, would not help replace American cotton:
before the cotton of India could be got or the
machinery prepared for its manufacture, the
probabilities are, that we should have no mills to
refit, no operatives to employ, no commerce to
sacrifice and no country to save ....
Why should
they [the English workers^ see their wives in rags,
their children famished, their cupboard empty, their
grates fireless, their homes denuded of every article
of furniture, themselves pressed into pauperism or
coerced into crime, because the mad mean government
of the Northern States has committed itself to one of
the most foolish and wicked wars ever waged by one
power against another ...?4

3
4

Owsley, p.12.
Quoted in Columbus Weekly Enquirer, 17 January, 1862.
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The belief in "King Cotton", well established by the
beginning of the war, was unshaken by news of abundant stockpiles
of cotton in the warehouses of England’s northern ports.

In

July 1861 the Richmond Whig acknowledged that England had Va large
supply of cotton snug and safe in her warehouses":
But just wait a while, and let these warehouses
become empty — the cotton spun up and sold — and
then, should the Southern ports still be blockaded,
we shall see the word ’neutrality’ banished from her
vocabulary, and the way and means devised for a
replenishing of stocks, and the consequent resumption
of the mills that may have been temporarily closed.5

The Mobile Register took much the same line during the first
summer of the war.

They anticipated the day when England and

France, and also Spain, Belgium, Russia, Switzerland "and a dozen
other countries” would find the "last bale gone."
The busy hum of {the] factory will cease, its doors
be closed and its operatives scattered, knowing not
where to find a loaf of bread.
Eight or nine
millions of people — white population equal to the
whole population of this vast and unconquerable
confederacy — will be turned out in a starving
condition, the cries for bread of each man, woman
and child of them, a solemn protest of humanity to
Heaven against Abraham Lincoln and his compeers ....
A short time, and we will learn what really is the
power of the cotton lever.
We will learn if it has
strength to move the world.
We will see if the
governments of Europe will turn a deaf ear to the
appealing cries of starving millions of the foreign
subjects of King Cotton ....
England, Europe,
cannot afford to wait for the Confederacy to conquer
a peace.
The spindles and the looms are working
out the defeat of the North and our independence ....6

^Richmond Whig, 9 July, 1861.
6
Mobile Register, 11 August, 1861.
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The basic message and the emotional pitch of the above is
typical of publications both in the South and in England.

Pollard

was certainly right when he wrote with hindsight in 1867 that it was
absurd to expect that England would act as if her empire depended
on "a single article of trade that was grown in A m e r i c a . B u t

it

would be wrong to assume that Southerners were out of step with the
received wisdom of the time.

In any event, this implicit, uncritical, and essentially
passive trust in "King Cotton" was short lived.
summer of 1863 the Richmond Whig could

write: "In

As late as the
spite of all

disappointments and doubts, Cotton jls King, if we had the nerve
g
pluck enough to crown and proclaim him such ...."
But this
became an exception.

From the summer

of 1861 the

action that would support the influence of cotton.

and

press called for
Higher prices

should be paid for commodities brought through the blockade, a
remission should be applied to all duties against imports, a
remission also on port and city charges, and Confederate purchase
of steamers that were capable of running the blockade.

There was

growing support for voluntary crop destruction in order "to startle
France and England from their apathy";

wherever the enemy has

penetrated, claimed the Whig "the cotton has been cheerfully given
as a holocaust on the altar of liberty."

9

^Pollard, The Lost Cause, pp.130-131.
g
Richmond Whig, 23 June, 1863.
9
Columbus Daily Enquirer, 29 July, 1861;
New Orleans Bee,
13 March, 1862;
Ibid., 27 July, 1861; Richmond Whig,
17 June, 1862.
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Therefore, during the first six months or so of the war, the
Southern press emphasised a fairly simplistic version of the ’’King
Cotton’* philosophy:
industries;

economic ruin for manufacturing and related

the pauperisation of massive numbers of operatives and

their dependents throughout Europe, and especially England and
France;

either revolution or, more likely, successful pressure on

European governments to open up the cotton supply through some form
of intervention.

This was not, however, the whole story.

Later,

when it was clear to all but the most stubborn that Europe was not
going to intervene for the sake of a cotton supply, attempts were
made to understand more fully the complexity of European interests.
Even as early as the autumn of 1861 there developed from the

passive

confidence in "King Cotton" an equally important strain ofthought
that questioned its logic.

This doubt, and sometimes outright

rejection, of "King Cotton" continued to the end of the war,
gathering strength as time passed and Confederate fortunes changes.

The Macon Daily Telegraph was the most consistent opponent of
the "King Cotton" philosophy and the only paper which never really
believed it.

In one of its last publications, in March 1865, it

wrote an apt epitaph:
'No, you dare not make war on cotton.
No power
on earth dares to do it. Cotton is King.'
This
sounds very absurd now, but how many of us believed
all this four years ago - - and a thousand kindred
fallacies.10

^ M a c o n Daily Telegraph, 22 March, 1865.
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As early as 1861, the Macon Daily Telegraph had opposed
Confederate reliance on "King Cotton” as a weapon because it acted
against the interests of free trade.

The chief practical argument

against restricting the cultivation of cotton, destroying existing
crops, or using cotton as a bargaining weapon was that it would
stimulate foreign production of cotton or encourage the
development of cotton substitutes.

Free trade, on the other hand,

would cultivate a "mutuality of interest —

a bond of ...

f r i e n d s h i p . I t would improve greatly the supply of much needed
European merchandise since payment for cotton would be in goods
rather than the more risky transportation of precious metal.
Merchandise and, even more important, food was the top priority.
The New Orleans Bee, in October 1861, called on cotton to yield its
crown for "those higher claimants to authority —

bread and meat."

12

In February 1862 the Macon Daily Telegraph declared:
Let us prepare for the struggle.
Let the very
crows in the field caw in scorn at the folly of the
planter who bothers himself about planting cotton
this spring.
In God's name let us have food cheaper
and plentier, or give up the ship ....
Will any
planter of common sense tell us what the army will do
— what the people are to do unless ten times more
corn and meat is raised at home?13
By the beginning of 1862 there was wide disillusionment with
"King Cotton".

The newspapers, Confederate and European,

continued to publish reports on the distress in the cotton districts

"^Ibid., 9 October, 1861.

12
13

New Orleans Bee, 14 October, 1861.
Macon Daily Telegraph, 15 February, 1862.

of England, the risk of revolution, and governments' inhumanity in
the face of the peoples' suffering.
seemed to be unaffected.
Telegraph noted this:

But the European governments

Some months earlier the Macon Daily

"We regret to see the composure and

resignation with which the British public are evidently preparing
to accept the loss of Southern cotton ... as an unavoidable
misfortune."

14

A new sombre orthodoxy developed during 1863:

"We

... h a v e attached entirely too much importance to the influence of
the cotton question ....

This has proved a serious error.";

"One principal ground of miscalculation ... has been the idea that
Cotton is King.";

"Bitter lessons" have reversed the belief in that

"good old tune.";

"The silly idea of cotton politicians ... is about

to expire even in the brains which could hold but that one i d e a . " ^
In November 1861 the Columbus Daily Enquirer had made the point:
The great truth is that Commerce has no King, it
is a democracy, in which the poorest commodity of
today may rise to the highest rank tomorrow ....
Until we have such diversity of interests and
pursuits that we can establish and maintain a home
value for our leading products, they will ever be
subject to vicissitudes such as we have witnessed
within the last twelve months.16

14

Macon Daily Telegraph, 23 October, 1861.

^"*New Orleans Bee, 4 March, 1862;
Columbus Daily Telegraph,
25 March, 1862; Mobile Daily Advertiser, 19 April, 1862;
Richmond Examiner, 20 August, 1862.

16

Columbus Daily Telegraph, 7 November, 1861.

The early support for England was not an expression of
friendliness.

England had the military might to take on the North,

and she was thought to be the most vulnerable to "King Cotton"
diplomacy.

When it became clear that England would not easily be

influenced by enticement or threat of cotton diplomacy the
Confederate press became openly aggressive.

There was not, to

begin with, any evidence in the Southern press of the feelings of
"admiration and friendliness" which Owsley suggests existed in the
South at the beginning of the w a r . ^

The flavour of the reporting

at the start of war supports more Edward Crapolfs thesis that
"Americans traditionally have distrusted, feared, and disliked
England."

18

Therefore, it was easy for the press to let loose

feelings of invective against England, especially when Confederate
fortunes were low.

The Trent affair, as we have already indicated, was the high
point in Confederate expectations of British involvement in the war.
When that opportunity passed there were few words of friendliness
for England.
June

The Savannah Republic published an

article in

1862 that was reprinted in other papers:
the true policy of the Confederate States consists
of cutting loose, in every practicable way, from
British trade, British monopoly, and British
bondage;
that, in the regulation of our commercial
treaties with nations abroad, we should discriminate
against enemies and in favour of friends.19

^Owsley, p.489.
18

19

Edward Crapol, America for Americans:
Economic Nationalism
and Anglophobia in the late Nineteenth Century (Westport,
Conn., 1973), p.4.
Richmond Whig, 12 June, 1862.
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In the Richmond Whig a correspondent who signed himself Rule
Slaveownia replied:
for a third of a century England has, by every
appliance of her legislature, her oratory, her
pulpit, her press, and her power, exerted herself
to the utmost, not only to bring our institutions
into disrepute, but to overthrow them entirely —
and further that she has every interest to do so.20

European intervention was by this time no more than a shallow
hope.

Antietam was to follow, the prospect of mediation had

failed, and by the summer of 1863 relations between the British and
Confederates were at a very low ebb.

21

The cool and aloof manner

of Palmerston's dealings with the Confederate Commissioner, an
affirmation of Britain's presumed attitude to the Confederacy, was
received as a bitter insult.

There was an understandable

frustration in the Confederate press.
reacted with a strain of "King Cotton".

The Columbus Enquirer
It suggested that the

Confederacy should, if it was possible to do so "without serious
injury to herself,"
transfer to a more friendly power the commercial
treasure that has given Great Britain half her
prosperity and enabled her to maintain her supremacy
on the high seas.
Never has a more fit occasion
offered to rebuke her heartlessness and perfidy;
never a better opportunity to exemplify to the world
the power of the resources of these States and the
value of their friendship.
Let Great Britain, when
our hour of triumph comes, have cause to exclaim, in
the language of her greatest dramatist

21

Cullop, p.85.
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Oh, fool! fool! fool!
I am one whose hand,
Like the base Judean, threw a pearl away
Richer than all his tribe.22

The Confederate press searched for the motives to explain why
Britain had turned away from what appeared to be her best interests,
and assumed instead the stance of "strict neutrality".

There were

many references to the concepts of honour, humanity, civilisation,
right, and selfishness.

But underlying these, and many specific

and sometimes outlandish notions, was the overwhelming notion of
national self-interest.

In April 1862 the Richmond Examiner put

it this way:
It is idle to urge consideration of right or justice,
against over-ruling motives of interest, real or
fancied, present or prospective.
The intensely
practical character of English people, faithfully
mirrored by the Government, never abandons the great
object of national aggrandizement.
Let them see
their way clearly to that goal, and solid reasons
enough will be found to support the policy that leads
to it.23

Behind the notion of self-interest lay, however, the issue of
slavery.

This was not often debated in the press although it is

to be sensed in the background and brought into focus through sharp
references to abolitionist fanatics, sentimental cant, the
extremists of Exeter Hall, and so on.

22
23

In August 1861 the

Columbus Daily Enquirer, 10 October, 1863.
Richmond Examiner, 20 April, 1863.
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Richmond Examiner did, however, print a major editorial on the
place of slavery.
aggression.

It was a blend of hurt incredulity and

The whole of the European public "is animated by the

most unfriendly sentiment towards the Southern community.*'

Other

slaveholding countries, the article claimed, received no such
criticisms

Russia, Turkey, Spain, Brazil, and Portugal ("the

peculiar protege of Abolitionist England*').

The answer was the

withdrawal of the Confederacy from Europe, as it had already done
from the Union;
Not till we prove ourselves independent of their
opinions, above and beyond their help, will we
obtain their amity and justice ....
We must
return disdain for disdain, defiance for calumny,
put far from us the fallacy that we have any
friend in the world ....
On our own swords we
must lean, on our own arms we must alone rely for
help, till we shall no longer need any other.24

Other articles followed in a number of newspapers, in a
similar vein.

The strongest was also in the Examiner, in

March 1863, which suggested that Britain sought to destroy slavery
and, by so doing, destroy also the Union.

Britain's attitude to

the Civil War was, according to the Examiner, based on her place in
world power politics.

She already had supremacy in shipping and

commerce that was based on "her insular position and vast colonial
interests" and was thus secure.

Her rich natural resources and

cheap labour gave to Britain an advantage in "the mechanical arts
and manufactures."

24

The one great interest in which the United

Richmond Examiner, 7 August, 1861.

States outstripped Britain, and which almost balanced Britain’s
other advantages, was cotton.

Britain's continuing supremacy in

the world depended, therefore, on two possible measures:

first,

the destruction of the cotton culture through the overthrow of the
institution of slavery;

second, the

Fomenting of "sectional

agitations" to force a separation of the Union.

An attack on the

cotton culture, through an implicit support of the North, was
chosen because it would achieve both objectives simultaneously.
Britain would get her monopoly of the cotton supply by eliminating
Southern competition, and the Union would be divided because of the
"imbecility of the intellect in which the North allowed itself to
be enlisted m

the mad work of self-destruction."

25

The Richmond Whig, in June 1863, got more directly to the
point:
Talk of England's aversion to slavery — she is
averse to it, deeply, bitterly, fanatically — the
leader and stimulator, if you please, of the anti
slavery agitation of the age — but England is not
so averse to anything, not so fixed in any principle,
as to let it interfere with what is her interest.
Ask any time what is the interest of England .... to
discover her policy or understand her conduct.26

The British did not need cotton as badly as the Confederate
press thought.

The economic consequences of the blockade were

severe, but not the catastrophe that was envisaged by many on both
sides of the Atlantic.

The risk of war with the North and the

25 Ibid., 7 August, 1861.
O £

Richmond Whig, 23 June, 1863.

58.
threat this would pose for the massive investment by British
capitalists in railways, banking, land speculation and manufacturing
was too high when balanced against the prospect of an outright
Confederate victory.

Also, Britain was fortunate in having a

colonial cotton supply, embryonic and inferior in quality to the
American, but a support system none the less.

And, defence of the

Confederacy would be seen as support for slavery.

Without

enormous advantages to go with it, this would have been politically
impossible.

Therefore, the risks were too high and the returns too
uncertain for the British to become embroiled in a dreadful
conflagration of such magnitude.

The Richmond Whig, in July 1862,

put the balanced view:^
We have shared in the general sense of wrong and
indignation, awakened in this country by the
apparent heartlessness of England in the pending
struggle.
Perhaps we may have judged
unreasonably.
England is selfish, as what
nation is not?27

Cullop suggests that the Richmond government lost patience
with Britain and shifted its attention to France by the autumn of
28
1863.
The Confederate press had started to do so by the early
months of 1862, and continued to speak of French aid until at
least 1864.

France offered the advantage over Britain because

^ I b i d . , 14 July, 1862,
OQ

Cullop, p.86.
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she offered no apparent threat to slavery.

Napoleon was a

practical statesman, claimed the Columbus Daily Enquirer, "Whose
policy is not biased by hereditary fanaticism or educational
prejudice."

29

And France, it could be claimed, had wanted to

recognise the Confederacy but had been prevented because of
British intransigence.

"King Cotton" diplomacy this time offered

inducements rather than threats.
The sagacious man who governs France is not
tethered by ... peace societies.
He acts from
the great interests of his country.
He could
be readily brought to see the immense advantages
which would accrue to France from a close and
exclusive commercial alliance with the Southern
States.30

In the final months of the Civil War the few papers that
survived not surprisingly had little to say for either Britain or
France.

In January 1865 the Richmond Whig, in true form, damned

them both.

It predicted with evident glee that with the defeat of

the Confederacy would grow an American power greater than any nation
in the world.

"Napoleon will find that he has finessed too deeply

and lost the game," and soon France would not "hold a colony
without consent" from the United States.
reserved the greatest derision and hatred.
and the West Indies;

But for Britain was
She would lose Canada

her fleets would be driven from the oceans;

American cruisers "would hang around the coast of Great Britain and

29
30

Columbus Daily Enquirer, 20 February, 1862.
Richmond Whig, 5 February, 1862.
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destroy her coasting trade":

Ireland and India would go;

Australia would be retained only as long as America permitted it.
"Are these things dreams?1* the Whig asked rhetorically:
Look at what has been going on here for four
years past, and then say what they are.
Here
is a power that within that time, has increased
her navy from thirty ships to six hundred — that
has increased her marine from a few thousand
sailors to fifty thousand.
Here are two powers
engaged in a deadly struggle, each of which has
sent forth armies sufficient to have overwhelmed
Great Britain and France.
These two armies, the
most tried and the best fighting in all the earth,
will be combined.
Recruits enough will be added
to make a million men.
They hate each other,
but they hate England even more.
At a signal —
the very slightest — this whole-force will be let
loose upon her ....
In forty years, the population of the United States
would be one hundred million.
It would be the
strongest nation the world ever beheld.
Its
influence over the whole world would be unparalleled
owing to the weakness and timidity of France and
England.31

In a satirical and powerful piece, the Mobile Daily Advertiser
glanced back at the European response to "King Cotton".
blockade was set and England and France acquiesced:

The

"Mr Ardent

Disposition" had claimed that when the cotton was spun and the
stockpiles exhausted things would be different:

31

Richmond Whig, 20 January, 1865.
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Let Manchester exhaust her stock;
let her
operatives fail to obtain employment, and begin
to starve;
and let it be seen that no raw
material is forthcoming and that cotton-planting
has ceased — then the listless old Lion will
begin to growl and ruffle his mane, and, mayhap,
lash his sides with his tail and rouse the
nations by his mighty roar.
But, one after
another factory stopped — others ran on half or
quarter time — operatives began to starve sure
enough, and a mighty cry of distress went up from
the masses.
'Abe!' says A.D., 'its' coming —
stand from under.'
But to the disappointment of
the said A.D., and all other ardent and expectant
dreamers among us, the drowsy, lazy, self-interested
old king of beasts, without raising his sleepy
muzzle from his folded paws, simply opened one eye
and said —
'FEED E M ! '
And immediately 'Old England' became one great poor
house, while sharp nosed Brother Jonathan allowed
his potato trap to expand into a significant grin,
and keen-sighted Southerners could just discern a
gentle swaying of the digits of his right hand,
while the thumb rested lightly upon the sharp
pointed nasal protuberance;
and thus burst the
bubble of raising the blockade to secure a supply of
cotton.
The roar which was to blow Uncle Sam
sky-high by its mighty concussions, simmered down to
a never explained inaction, and the mane which was
to be rumpled so belligerently remained in quiet
placidity.
In short, England kept out of the war
with all her might and mane, and thus the mainstay
of the rebellion failed to respond to our 'great
expectations.'
As for the Gallic cock, he flapped his wings once or
twice, but when he essayed to crow his voice failed
him.
For no sooner had he stretched forth his neck
for the effort, flapping his wings close to the
sleepy forest-monarch's nose, in order to attract his
attention and obtain his assistance, then seeing the
ruffled feathers on the American Eagles outstretched
neck, and casting a slight glance from his flashing
eye, then all sound and fury died away.32

32

Mobile Daily Advertiser, 10 June, 1865.
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The Southern newspaper press was committed to European
intervention in some form, and the expectation or hope that this
would happen was the thread that ran through wartime editorial
comment.

The movement from expectation or hope, to certainty and to
despair, reflected the unhealthy reliance that the South placed on
European, and especially British, support for the Confederate cause.
This reliance at times seemed to shift responsibility from the
Confederacy to Europe.

Recognition by Britain of the sovereignty

of the Southern States initially was expected as of right;

the

possibility that Britain might do otherwise seemed inconceivable.
The blockade was to be broken with scant regard for the
consequences to Britain.

The Trent affair was welcomed by the

South because of the possibility that Britain would enter the war
not so much as an ally of the Confederacy but as a direct
antagonist of the North.

In these matters the Confederacy had a

passive role as far as the press seemed to suggest.

The most

favourable outcome, it often seemed, would be that Britain made war
with the North thereby debilitating or defeating the enemy on the
South’s behalf.

Implicit in this attitude was a kind of fatalism

that helps explain the frantic way that attention passed from
Britain to France as friend and potential protector and the
violence of the eventual denunciation of Britain.

But interwoven with this fatalism and the supporting rhetoric
which espoused notions of brotherhood, kindred spirits, the
mother-country and so on, was a realism that recognised national

self-interest as the ultimate influence in international affairs.
"King Cotton" was after all the starkest manifestation of that.
The newspapers advocated both directly and indirectly, and without
qualm or introspection, the naked use of the presumed power of
cotton in the interests of the South.
prove a miscalculation.

This of course was to

The crude aggression and the

enticement which underpinned the newspaper^ support for cotton
diplomacy did not work.

For the British the awful consequences

of involvement in the war were unthinkable given the very high
risks balanced against probable gains.
there are no unselfish acts;

In international diplomacy

all the South could really hope for

was that their interests and those of England or, failing that,
France, would coincide.

Thus, all nations are selfish and, as

the Richmond Whig so aptly expressed it, "The selfishness of
nations is patriotism.”

33

^ R i c h m o n d Whig, 14 July, 1862.
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